WIT-EC 2013 - 2013 WORKSHOP ON INCENTIVE AND TRUST IN E-COMMERCE (WIT-EC'13)

The 2nd WIT-EC workshop will be held together with the 23rd International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI'13), August 3-9, 2013, in Beijing, China.
With the growth of electronic marketplaces, frauds in e-markets are on the rise. Some possible sources of frauds could be: 1) anonymous identities of trading parties; 2) uncertainty about quality of products due to the asymmetry of information between trading parties; and 3) the lack of interpersonal interactions among them in e-markets.
Trust and reputation mechanisms seem to be effective solutions to enhance the performance of participants in e-markets. However, they cannot show their full functionalities without proper contributions of participants in providing honest information about each other. Therefore, trust and reputation mechanisms should be accompanied with self-enforcing mechanisms in order to provide sufficient incentives for participants to disseminate and share their truthful information. On another hand, trust and reputation measures are often used as part of incentive mechanisms to promote honesty in e-markets. Thus, trust and incentives have such a bidirectional relationship.
The main objective of this workshop is to bring together researchers in both the area of game theory for designing incentive mechanisms and the area of trust and reputation modeling, towards the design of more effective trust, reputation and incentive mechanisms for creating safe e-marketplace environments.
The focus of the workshop will be on techniques for designing incentive mechanisms in e-markets considering personal, social and and economic aspects of computational trust and reputation mechanisms. The workshop welcomes articles with research contributions in the fields of computer science, psychology, philosophy, management science which use a multidisciplinary approach to create incentives and address the problem of lack of honesty in e-markets.
Topics of interest include, but are not limited to:
? Social, cognitive and computational trust, reputation and inventive models
? Robustness of trust, reputation and incentive mechanisms
? Attacks on, and defences for, trust, reputation and incentive mechanisms
? Cross-cultural approaches
? Components and dimensions of sociotechnical trust
? Game theoretic approaches to trust and reputation
? Risk management and trust
? Trust management dynamics
? Trust, regret, and forgiveness
? Economic drivers for trustworthy systems
? Trust and economic models
? Trust metrics assessment and threat analysis
? Context-aware trust assessments
? Evolution of trust
? Trust-based incentive mechanisms
? User interfaces to incentive mechanisms