WIT-EC 2014 - AAAI 2014 Workshop on Incentives and Trust in E-Communities

The 3nd WIT-EC workshop will be held together with the Twenty-Eighth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI'14), July 27-31, 2014, in Quebec, Canada.
The area of trust and reputation modeling has experienced rapid growth in the past decade. With the growing prevalence of social interaction through electronic means, trust, reputation and privacy, become considerably important. Many computational and theoretical models of trust and reputation mechanisms have been recently developed well-suited for variety of domains such as e-commerce, social network, blogs, ad hoc networks, etc. They present trust as a multi-faceted concept which operates at many levels and plays important roles in ensuring reliable interactions.
Although designing trust-enabled systems allow people to act under uncertainty and mitigate the risk of negative consequences still socio-technical attacks often succeed by exploiting loopholes in the design of trust and security policies. Besides, the diversity of participants in the continuously growing online communities encourages cheating and opportunistic behaviours as it is more difficult in such environments to detect and punish fraudulent users. Many techniques have been developed to discourage deception and fraud in e-communities and stabilize trust between participants. These techniques are designed to promote trusting relationships, honesty behaviours and create incentive for participants to contribute truthful opinions.
Trust and incentive have bidirectional relationships. As trustworthiness measures are used as part of incentive mechanisms to promote honesty in electronic communities, incentive mechanisms motivate participants to contribute their truthful opinions that are useful for trust modeling. Hence, trust and reputation systems should not only provide a means to detect and prevent malicious activities but also design a mechanism to discourage dishonesty attitudes amongst participants. The evidential success of combining these two concepts inspires and encourages researchers in the trust community to enhance the efficacy and performance of trust modeling approaches by adopting various incentive mechanisms.
The main objective of this workshop is to bring together researchers in both the area of game theory for designing incentive mechanisms and the area of trust and reputation modeling, towards the design of more eective trust, reputation and incentive mechanisms for creating safe electronic communities.